Strangler In The Fridge Preview

…Oops, that should have been Stranger On The Bridge, “Strangler In The Fridge” was a sort of code during production. If you want to know what we get up to when not working on Maritime Accident Casebook check out the trailer etc. for Stranger On The Bridge here.

There is a bit of form filling before you get to the link.

Maritime Safety News Today – 31st March 2008

Broken boat capsizes during Coast Guard tow, three dead, one man …
The Canadian Press – ILES-DE-LA-MADELEINE, Que.
A fisherman aboard a sealing vessel trailing the disabled boat said the light icebreaker Sir William Alexander pulled L’Acadien II over a large chunk of ice …

Vessel sinks, crew escape
Hindu – Chennai,India
The crew members had boarded the lifeboat and were heading for shore by the time the coast guards team traced the sinking vessel, the sources said.

Vessels collide in Straits of Mackinaw
SooToday.com – USA
… a collision between two vessels in the Straits of Mackinaw. There was reported damage to both vessels, however neither vessel is taking on water. 

Ukrainian tug captain tells of last minutes before sinking: report
Tolerance.ca – Montreal,Quebec,Canada
Photo shows the damage done to the Chinese register cargo ship, the Yao Hai, following a collision with an Ukranian tugboat on March 22, near the site where .

Crewman describes alarm, flooding on fishing vessel
Seattle Post Intelligencer – USA
The investigation will focus on the causes of the sinking, the response and the rescue. Testimony Saturday focused on the sinking and Coast Guard …

Filipino seafarer freed from Bangladesh jail after 15 years
Inquirer.net – Philippines
MANILA, Philippines — A Filipino seafarer who has been in jail in Bangladesh for 14 years on charges of gold smuggling has been released and is set to fly …

Bush apologizes to Mubarak for Suez shooting
International Herald Tribune – France
He was shot on Monday evening as he approached a cargo ship, the Global Patriot. The ship was under contract to the Navy, which has been wary of small 

ATC On LRADs

Regarding your recent LRAD® article posted at this link:

http://maritimeaccident.wordpress.com/2008/03/25/does-lrad-work/

“After the USS Cole was attacked in October 2000, the U.S. Navy asked American Technology Corporation (ATC) to use our expertise in shaping sound to create a directed acoustic hailing and warning device (AHD) to enable sailors to determine the intent of approaching vessels with unknown intentions, and to help create large safety zones surrounding U.S. Navy ships. ATC introduced its proprietary LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device) technology and products in 2002. LRAD uses high intensity 15º – 30º focused acoustic output to communicate well in excess of 500 meters with authority and high intelligibility. Through the use of powerful voice commands and deterrent tones, large safety zones can be created while determining the intent, influencing the behavior and gaining the compliance of the crew of an unknown vessel. Since the sound is directed away from the LRAD operator, it is much safer than utilizing conventional loudspeakers or bullhorn systems in an attempt to accomplish the same objective.

ATC has more than 1,000 LRAD’s in operation around the world including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Australia, Singapore, Korea, Russia, the E.U., the U.K. And China. Last year, the U.S. Navy’s selected our LRAD 1000X as its acoustic hailing and warning device for large vessels, and the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army’s chose our LRAD 500X as their AHD for small vessels and vehicles.

LRAD is an important new tool that is vital in giving military and commercial maritime personnel the ability to determine intent at distance and has the potential to resolve misunderstandings and save lives on both sides of the device.”

MAC did ask about civilian real-world examples, to which ATC responded, and got the following response:

“There have been military instances. However, the military prefers to keep quiet about them for security reasons.”

We would emphasise, although LRAD, and some other technologies, were designed to deal with precisely the situation the Global Patriot found itself in, neither the ship, nor its on-board US Navy Security team were equipped with the device.

Unfortunately, the warning system, and rules of engagement, on the Global Patriot were not appropriate for the situation, a situation perceived following the USS Cole incident, in which a small boat might approach within a defence zone without hostile intent.

The rules of engagement evidently assumed that all craft have bridges equipped with VHF radios tuned to the appropriate channel. Bumboats generally have neither bridges nor VHF radios.

The next level of warning assumed that a loudhailer could be heard clearly above the din of a noisy clapped-out outboard on the bumboat. This seems to be an unwise assumption.

It is doubtful, therefore, whether the first two sets of warnings were perceived.

A flare was fired. Was this an unambiguous message, or was it like a driver flashing his lights at an intersection?  Evidentially, it was not an unambiguous message.

The final warning was to fire shots in front of the boat, a fairly unambiguous warning but, in this case, producing one fatality and two injuries. Circumstances suggest that at least one of the warning shots bounced off the water, killing one of the non-hostile persons aboard the bumboat.

Article of note: Joe O’Keefe – Criminalizing the Cosco Busan Incident

Joe O’Keefe of Maritime Executive magazine reviews the impact of criminal charges recently laid against the pilot of the Cosco Busan.  It could be the end of an era that has long passed it’s use by date.

Says Joe:

“I don’t know who made the decision to move the Cosco Busan (or why) on that fateful day. Perhaps we’ll never know. What I do know is that last week’s announcement by the Department of Justice changes the rules of the game forever. And, the Coast Guard is very soon going to have to change the answer to a certain multiple choice question on the Rules of the Road Exam, which asks, “What is the role of the pilot on the bridge of a large cargo vessel?” Hint: the answer is no longer “c.”  “

Read it here. 

Bourbon Dolphin Report Released – Tug Stability, Captain’s Competence, not checked

No single cause led to the capsize of the AHTS Bourbon Dolphin with the loss of eight lives, with seven survivors, on April 12, 2007 says a report into the sinking released by Norway’s Justice Ministry, but Bourbon Offshore, which owned the vessel has been criticised for inadequately checking the vessel’s stability following an earlier incident and for not ensuring that the captain, Oddne Remøy, was sufficiently familiar with the vessel sand its crew before undertaking the operation that led to the capsize.

Key conclusions are:
• The vessel was built and equipped as an all-round vessel AHSV (Anchor Handling Supply Vessel). Uniting these functions poses special challenges. In addition to bollard pull, anchor-handling demands thruster capacity, powerful winches, big drums and equipment for handling chain. Supply and cargo operations demand the biggest possible, and also flexible, cargo capacities both on deck and in tanks. The “Bourbon Dolphin” was a
relatively small and compact vessel, in which all these requirements were to
be united.

• The company had no previous experience with the A 102 design and ought therefore to have undertaken more critical assessments of the vessel’s characteristics, equipment and not least operational limitations, both during her construction and during her subsequent operations under various conditions. The company did not pick up on the fact that the vessel had experienced an unexpected stability-critical incident about two months after
delivery.

• The vessel’s stability-related challenges were not clearly communicated from shipyard to company and onwards to those who were to operate the vessel.

• Under given load conditions the vessel did not have sufficient stability to handle lateral forces. The winch’s pulling-power was over-dimensioned in relation to what the vessel could in reality withstand as regards stability.

• The anchor-handling conditions prepared by the shipyard were not realistic. Nor did the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s regulatory system make any requirement that these be approved.

• The ISM Code demands procedures for the key operations that the vessel is to perform, Despite the fact that anchor-handling was the vessel’s main function, there was no vessel-specific anchor-handling procedure for the “Bourbon Dolphin”.

• The company did not follow the ISM code’s requirement that all risk be identified.

• The company did not make sufficient requirements for the crew’s qualifications for demanding operations. The crew’s lack of experience was not compensated for by the addition of experienced personnel.

• The master was given 1½ hours to familiarise himself with the crew and vessel and the ongoing operation. In its safety management system the company has a requirement that new crews shall be familiarised with (inducted into) the vessel before they can take up their duties on board. In practice the master familiarises himself by overlapping with another master who knows the vessel, before he himself is given the command.

• Neither the company nor the operator ensured that sufficient time was made available for hand-over in the crew change.

• The vessel was marketed with continuous bollard pull of 180 tonnes. During an anchor-handling operation, in practice thrusters are always used for manoeuvring and dynamic positioning. The real bollard pull is then materially reduced. The company did not itself investigate whether the vessel was suited to the operation, but left this to the master.

• The company did not see to the acquisition of information about the content and scope of the assignment the “Bourbon Dolphin” was set to carry out. The company did not itself do any review of the Rig Move Procedure (RMP) with a view to risk exposure for crew and vessel. The company was thus not in a position to offer guidance.

• The Norwegian classification society Det norske Veritas (DNV) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate were unable to detect the failures in the company’s systems though their audits.

• In specifying the vessel, the operator did not take account of the fact that the real bollard pull would be materially reduced through use of thrusters. In practice the “Bourbon Dolphin” was unsuited to dealing with the great forces to which she was exposed.

• The mooring system and the deployment method chosen were demanding to handle and vulnerable in relation to environmental forces.

• Planning of the RMP was incomplete. The procedure lacked fundamental and concrete risk assessments. Weather criteria were not defined and the forces were calculated for better weather conditions than they chose to operate in. Defined safety barriers were lacking. It was left to the discretion of the rig and the vessels whether operations should start or be suspended.

• In advance of the operation no start-up meeting with all involved parties was held. The vessels did not receive sufficient information about what could be expected of them, and the master misunderstood the vessel’s role.

• The procedure demanded the use of two vessels that had to operate at close quarters in different phases during the recovery and deployment of anchors. The increased risk exposure of the vessels was not reflected in the procedure.

• The procedure lacked provisions for alternative measures (contingency planning), for example in uncontrollable drifting from the run-out line. Nor were there guidelines for when and in what way such alternative measures should be implemented and what if any risk these would involve.

• The deployment of anchor no. 2 was commenced without the considerable drifting during the deployment of the diagonal anchor no. 6 had been evaluated.

• Human error on the part of the rig and the vessels during the performance of the operation.

• Communication and coordination between the rig and the vessel was defective during the last phase of the operation.

• Lack of involvement on the part of the rig when the “Bourbon Dolphin” drifted.

• The roll reduction tank was most probably in use at the time of the accident.

• The inner starboard towing pin had been depressed and the chain was lying against the outer starboard towing pin. The chain thereby acquired a changed angle of attack.

The incident was investigated by a Royal Commission which held five open hearings and questioned 38 witnesses, including the survivors, officers from other vessels that participated in the operation, individuals from the owner company, the shipyard, the operator company Chevron, the drillrig “Transocean Rather”, the UK consultancy firm Trident, and The Norwegian Maritime Directorate and the classification society Det Norske Veritas. In addition the Commission has collected and reviewed a large quantity of documentation related to the vessel and the operation in which the “Bourbon Dolphin” was involved when the accident happened. The Commission has also had access to underwater footage of the casualty taken straight after the capsize and of the wreck in December 2007. Members of the Commission have held a meeting with the parties’ stability experts and gained access to material that the latter had collected.

In its report the Commission points out that it is not possible to show that an individual error, whether technical or human, led to the accident; rather, a series of circumstances acted together to cause the loss of the vessel. The Commission concludes that the proximate causes of the accident were the vessel’s change of course to port (west) so as to get away from mooring line no. 3, at the same time as the inner starboard towing pin was depressed, causing the chain to rest against the outer port towing pin. This gave the chain an altered point and angle of attack on the vessel. Together with the vessel’s current load condition, the fact that the roll reduction tank was probably in use, and the effect on the vessel and chain of external forces, caused the vessel to capsize.

It emerges from the report that a number of indirect factors have contributed to the accident. A combination of weaknesses in the design of the vessel, and failures in the handling of safety systems by the company, by the operator and on the rig, are major contributory factors to the operation of 12 April 2007 coming out of control. Overall, system failures on the part of many players caused necessary safety barriers to be lacking, were ignored or were breached, so that the vessel and crew were exposed to a risk that resulted in the accident.

The Commission also makes a number of recommendations in its report with a view to preventing similar accidents in the future. Although no structural changes are proposed for existing vessels, it is recommended that in the future requirements are made for the preparation of stability calculations for anchor-handling that will be subject to approval by the authorities. In addition, requirements are proposed for formal training of winch operators and a review of requirements for survival suits, plus placement and installation of rescue floats. The Commission also proposes measures to improve the companies’ safety management systems. Risk assessments must be improved, there must be routines for overlap of new personnel and identification of the necessary crew qualifications, plus the preparation of vessel-specific anchor-handling procedures.

The Commission also points out that the operators’ rig move procedures must be made specific for every operation and be simple to understand for those operating under them. It must be insisted that the operator and rig prepare risk assessments for the entire operation before it is commenced. When the operation is executed, safety and coordination must be continuously evaluated. The Commission also proposes that an attention zone be introduced along the anchor line, indicating a maximum distance within which the vessel shall remain when running out anchors.

Press Conference Video

Commission Report, preliminary English Version

Animation, first sequence

Animation, Second Sequence

Maritime Safety News Today – 28th March 2008

Four missing after cargo vessel hits bridge in E China
China Daily – China
BEIJING – China’s maritime search and rescue center said on Thursday morning that an empty cargo vessel hit a bridge under construction near the eastern

Ferries ‘often cut channel’
Manly Daily – Manly,NSW,Australia
It also found the ferry master had been travelling too fast and was taking a short cut across the channel against NSW Maritime regulations, but dismissed 

Numerous errors cited in Candida’s fire, sinking
The Triton (press release) – Fort Lauderdale,FL,USA
“Given the vessel’s recent trans-Atlantic voyage in rough sea conditions, the captain’s increased workload following the departure of the engineer, .

Investigation launched into fishing boat grounding
TV3 News – Auckland,New Zealand
The grounding of a 100-tonne fishing boat in the Far North this month will be investigated by Maritime New Zealand. The 20-metre Seawyf has been flooded and 

US Coast Guard responds to oil spill from towing vessel Dale White
BYM News (press release) – Gibraltar,Spain
The US Coast Guard is conducting an investigation into the grounding and subsequent oil spill from the towing vessel Dale White in the Cal-Sag Channel. 

Container ships sailing too close to shore
Central Midlands & Coastal Advocate – Moora,WA,Australia
Kevin Crane from the DEC in Jurien Bay said he had been in contact with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and there were no specific rules

Napoli removal to start in May
BBC News – UK
Work to remove the remaining section of MSC Napoli off the coast of Devon is set to start in May. The ship was deliberately beached in Lyme Bay after being .

Gotta Xenyx?

Help! If anyone out there has, or is willing to donate a 220v power adaptor for a Behringer Xenyx 802, to MAC we’d very much like to hear from you at mac@maritimeaccident.com. They’re rather thin on the ground in this neck of the woods and we need one for our podcasting facilities.

Maritime Safety News Today – 27th March 2008

Two bodies pulled from sunken Ukrainian tugboat
RIA Novosti – Moscow,Russia
Earlier this week, Anatoliy Prisyazhnyuk, the owner of the Ukrainian vessel, blamed the Chinese dry cargo ship for the fatal collision.

2 crewmen on Thai ship seriously injured; airlifted to Staten …
Staten Island Advance – SILive.com – Staten Island,NY,USA
The accident occurred Saturday during heavy seas as the men were working on board the Thor Alliance, home ported in Thailand, which was en route to New York

US embassy confirms death in Suez Canal shooting incident
Monsters and Critics.com – USA
On Monday, the crew of the Global Patriot ship opened fire on a small Egyptian boat, killing one man and injuring two. The incident happened as the ship was 

World’s fast-growing fleets hit by scarcity of crew
Financial Times – London,England,UK
“We’re talking of -several tens of thousands of seafarers missing from the equation,” he says. The Philippines is the world’s largest source of maritime 

Fatal boat crash ‘due to human error’
The West Australian – Perth,Western Australia,Australia
The vessel had not been visible to the master of the Pam Burridge until it was too late to avoid the collision, the report said.

The Case Of The Triple Cross

A ferry with a faulty radar, a containership closing a half a mile a minute, and an oil tanker, all trying to occupy the same space at the same time – can a mad German dentist avoid disaster?

Check pout our podcast page to find out more.

Weekly Piracy Report

Weekly Piracy Report from the International Maritime Bureau
18-24 March 2008

The following is a summary of the daily reports broadcast by the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre to ships in Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean Regions on the SafetyNET service of Inmarsat-C from 18 to 24 March 2008.

ALERT

Chittagong anchorage, Bangladesh
The number of attacks has reduced since 2006. However, the area is still listed as a high risk area and mariners are advised to be cautious especially while approaching the anchorage and while at anchor at Chittagong

Nigeria
Violent attacks carried out by pirates on board vessels at anchor and vessel carrying out STS operations. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution in these waters.

Suspicious crafts

None reportedRecently reported incidents

23.03.2008: 0055 LT: Tema anchorage, Ghana. Three robbers boarded a chemical tanker at anchor. Duty crew noticed the robbers. Bridge informed.  D/O raised alarm, sounded ship’s whistle and crew mustered. Robbers jumped into the water and escaped. Nothing stolen. Port control informed. A security boat came and conducted a full search of the area.

19.03.2008: 0312 UTC: 10:46.8N – 066:44.5E, Arabian sea. A tanker, underway detected a suspicious boat about 6nm ahead. As the tanker altered to keep clear of the boat, the boat kept altering to remain in front of the vessel. Alarm raised, crew mustered and anti-piracy measures initiated. Master increased speed and crew activated fire hoses. At a distance of 3 cables, the boat finally stopped and the tanker and moved away. The crew noticed 6 persons onboard the boat.

19.03.2008: 0300 LT: Tanga anchorage, Tanzania. A robber from a fishing boat boarded an anchored container ship. The robber jumped overboard as soon as the anti-piracy crew spotted him. Alarm raised, crew mustered and searched the ship. Nothing stolen. The watch keepers noticed seven more people in the boat.

18.03.2008: 0350 UTC: 12:53.2N-050:14.7E: Gulf of Aden. Two speedboats, length 5 meters, with five persons in each boat, dressed in camouflage cloths and armed with automatic weapons approached a VLCC in ballast.  Master raised alarm, crew alerted, evasive manoeuvres taken and speed increased.  The boats fired shots in the air. Later, the boats aborted the attempted boarding.  All vessels in the vicinity warned.

17.03.2008: 0230 LT: Enroute Cagbalite, Mituban and Balisen, Polilio Island, Philippines. A passenger boat with ten passenger including five crewmembers was returning to Polilio Island after discharging her cargo on the mainland.  Two passengers who had earlier boarded after asking for a ride to Polilio Island took control of the boat and shot dead three crewmembers including the captain. The pirates then tied them to the anchor and threw them overboard. The pirates shot the remaining two-crew members and injured them. One of the injured jumped into the sea and is still missing.  The other injured crew is recuperating in the hospital.  Three other passengers including a child were unharmed. The coast guard has mounted a search for the missing and dead crewmembers and the pirates who fled in a motor boat.

Piracy prone areas and warnings

Mariners are warned to be extra cautious and to take necessary precautionary measures when transiting the following areas:

S E Asia and the Indian Sub Continent

• Bangladesh : Sixty two incidents have been reported since January 2006. Pirates are targeting ships preparing to anchor. Most attacks reported at Chittagong anchorages and approaches. Although the number of attacks has fallen recently, the area is still listed as very high risk.
• Indonesia : Balongan, Balikpapan, Belawan. Generally be vigilant in other areas. Many attacks may have gone unreported.
• Malacca straits : Although the number of attacks has dropped due to the increase and constant patrols by the littoral states relevant Authorities since July 2005, ships are advised to continue maintaining a strict anti piracy watch when transiting the straits.
• Philippines : Manila – Pirates target ships at anchor.
• Singapore Straits : Pirates seen attacking ships while at anchor but in the past several ships were attacked while underway.

Africa and Red Sea

• Lagos (Nigeria) : Pirates are violent and have attacked and robbed vessels/kidnapped crews along the coast and river, at anchorages and ports. A total of 42 incidents have been reported in Nigeria since 08.01.2007. Twenty five attacks alone for Lagos and seven for Bonny River. Generally be vigilant in other areas in Nigeria.
• Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) : Twenty incidents have been reported since 05.06.2006. Pirates are targeting ships in port and anchorages.
• Mombasa (Kenya):
• Gulf of Aden / Red Sea : Numerous pirate attacks have been reported by ships and yachts in the Gulf of Aden/Red sea. In the past, some of the vessels were fired upon.
• Somalian waters : The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre has received 31 actual and attempted attacks in 2007. Many more attacks may have gone unreported. Some pirates are dangerous and would fire their automatic weapons at ships to stop them. Occasionally, they would use their RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) launchers at ships. Pirates are believed to be using “mother vessels” to launch attacks at very far distance from coast. These “mother vessel” is able to proceed to very far out to sea to launch smaller boats to attack and hijack passing ships. Eastern and Northeastern coasts are high risk areas for attacks and hijackings. Vessels not making scheduled calls to ports in Somalia should keep as far away as possible from the Somali coast, ideally more than 200 nautical miles. Mariners are also advised to report any suspicious boats to the Centre.

South and Central America and the Caribbean waters

• Brazil : Though the number of attacks has dropped in Santos, ships are advised to continue to be vigilant.
• Peru : Callao

Rest of the World

• Arabian Sea : Sightings and calls from suspicious small boats. In some cases, boats pursued the ships with unknown intent.